Rep. Garamendi Demands Answers On Firings of Nuclear Weapons Diplomats

WASHINGTON, DC — This week, Representative John Garamendi (D-CA), co-chair of the Congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio demanding answers on the chaotic firings of key government experts in nuclear weapons diplomacy with working group co-chairs Senator Ed Markey (D-MA), Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and Representatives Don Beyer (D-VA) and key working group members Representative Bill Foster (D-IL), Representative Jim McGovern (D-MA), Representative Lloyd Doggett (D-TX), and Representative Rashida Tlaib (D-MI).

This letter comes at a time when risks of weapons proliferation are higher than they have been in decades, and with the last remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, the New START treaty, is set to expire in February. If Trump and Putin fail to reach a deal, then for the first time in decades, there will be no limits on nuclear arms competition between the two nations.  

Both leaders have recognized the importance of preventing an unrestrained nuclear buildup: in July, President Trump said, “That’s not an agreement you want expiring...When you take off nuclear restrictions, that’s a big problem.” And this week, Putin announced that Russia will abide by the limits on strategic nuclear weapons prescribed by New START for an additional year, inviting the United States to do the same.

Yet, at this critical juncture, New START negotiations have not begun in earnest and the administration is removing diplomats who are experts in arms control and nonproliferation. It is vital that we take serious steps towards restoring nuclear diplomacy to ensure stability and prevent a nuclear arms race.

"In diplomacy – perhaps more than in any other domain – expertise, institutional memory, and trusted relationships are irreplaceable," said the signers. "We are concerned that reductions in force have been non-methodical, chaotic, and have the potential to undermine national security. At a time of heightened global instability, retaining technical knowledge in nuclear and chemical threat reduction is not only prudent but essential to U.S. national security."

"It is more important than ever that the United States remind the world that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,'" said Congressman Garamendi. "By shutting out expert diplomats, the Trump administration is sending the wrong message and making us all less safe. I urge the administration to reverse course and ask all the irreplaceable experts to return to serving their country."

"As a physicist, I know firsthand how irreplaceable the technical knowledge of our nuclear experts is for safeguarding our security and ensuring a safer world,” said Congressman Foster. “With New START set to expire and allies and adversaries alike openly reconsidering nuclear capabilities, American leadership is desperately needed to prevent escalation and avoid an unrestrained nuclear arms race. The Trump Administration must take the necessary steps to reverse its shortsighted and reckless purge of nuclear expertise before it inflicts lasting damage on our national security and heightens the risk of global conflict.”

The full text of the letter can be found HERE and below.

Dear Secretary Rubio:

August marked the 80th anniversary of the United States’ atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only time nuclear weapons have been used in conflict. As we reflect on the devastation wrought by these bombings, and the significant advances in nuclear weapons capabilities since, we are reminded of the moral and strategic imperative to reduce nuclear risks via robust diplomacy and nonproliferation efforts. The Department of State, including the personnel reporting to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, plays a vital role in this mission.

We write to express our grave concern regarding reports that State Department restructuring has led to the loss of senior experts and the elimination of positions in nuclear testing, verification, multilateral nuclear diplomacy, and chemical weapons, among other roles.1 In diplomacy – perhaps more than in any other domain – expertise, institutional memory, and trusted relationships are irreplaceable. We are concerned that reductions in force have been non-methodical, chaotic, and have the potential to undermine national security. At a time of heightened global instability, retaining technical knowledge in nuclear and chemical threat reduction is not only prudent but essential to U.S. national security.  

For example, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) – the last remaining bilateral arms control treaty between the United States and Russia – is set to expire on February 5, 2026, less than five months from now. Yesterday, President Putin indicated Russia is prepared to continue adhering to the central limits imposed by New START for an additional year.2 President Trump has publicly acknowledged the importance of avoiding nuclear arms racing and the strategic value of diplomatic engagement. In July he stated, referring to New START: “That’s not an agreement you want expiring. We’re starting to work on that. When you take off nuclear restrictions, that’s a big problem.”3 The elimination of senior officials with deep expertise in nuclear diplomacy could complicate efforts to replace New START, or to pursue future agreements, including with the People’s Republic of China.

At the same time, questions surrounding the United States’ commitment to extended deterrence have led Poland, South Korea, Japan, and even Germany to openly consider developing independent nuclear weapons capabilities.45 The United States will also likely be engaged in discussions and negotiations regarding civil nuclear cooperation agreements6 that will involve protecting longstanding U.S. interests to minimize the spread of sensitive nuclear technology and material. In the coming year, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Chemical Weapons Convention member states will be engaged in diplomacy and directing inspections in Syria to resolve questions about its residual chemical weapons arsenal,7 continue investigating evidence that Russia is using riot control agents in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,8 and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons member states will elect a new Director-General.9

These developments require serious attention and input from seasoned State Department officials, yet the re-organization appears to undermine the State Department's capacity to provide the necessary expertise and input to address these and other urgent international security, nonproliferation, and arms control issues.

We seek additional information on how the announced plan to merge the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS) with the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)10 would affect the United States capabilities to effectively manage these and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues. We have heard reports that both Bureaus have lost expert leadership in the ongoing reduction in force at the Department, and there is a lack of clarity on who now has primary responsibility within the State Department to represent the United States’ interest in several key WMD-related areas.

To this end, we request answers to the following questions by October 20, 2025:

• Which nuclear and chemical weapons policy experts have been removed or left the Department of State as part of the ongoing reductions in force and restructuring? What leadership positions remain unfilled at the Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels?  Which remaining officials have experience in negotiating with Russia and/or China?
• Which bureaus or offices were the departed nuclear experts from? Were these removals tied to the elimination of specific units or the elimination of specific functions? Which programs or positions will be removed or consolidated in the restructuring? Please provide the exact position descriptions and justifications for any positions deemed duplicative?
• What programs or policy areas were these individuals leading or supporting? What specific subject matter expertise and relevant training did the removed individuals possess?  
• What was the length of service of each of the individuals removed? Were any of the individuals removed veterans?  
• Can you commit to refraining from firing any more nuclear experts? Will you commit to rehiring any experts with unique skills and expertise?
• We have heard reports that you eliminated the office of Public Affairs and Government relations at both ADS and ISN. If true, we are concerned that this will make it much harder for the Congress to keep abreast of the many programs managed by ADS and ISN. What is the Department’s justification for this action? Was any cost-benefit analysis undertaken prior to this action?
• Has the Department formally considered how these cuts to our nuclear expertise and capacity will be interpreted by allies and adversaries, and if so, through what process and what conclusions did the Department reach? If not, will you direct the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to produce a report to this effect?
• How many employees lost in the reduction in force did jobs related to the above issue areas? How do you plan to achieve President Trump’s intent to avoid nuclear arms racing and ensure continued restraints on nuclear arsenals with the reduced force size?  
• What processes will be used, and which individual personnel will specifically be responsible for, preparing the following diplomatic engagements, including developing strategy, preparing guidance, and coordinating across agencies: representing the United States at the UN First Committee meetings this fall in New York? Representing the United States at the "P5 Process" consultations? Serving as the U.S. National Authority on the Chemical Weapons Convention and at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons meetings of state parties? Representing the United States at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission in Vienna? Representing the United States at meetings and consultations leading up to the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2026? Representing the United States at the Conference on Disarmament and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva?
• President Trump stated that the United States is “working on” a renewal or replacement for New START. Who is now charged with the responsibility for helping to develop options for the negotiation of such an arrangement? When does the administration expect an Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security will be confirmed? When will the administration's strategy for negotiating the new limits on strategic nuclear arms be completed? Will the administration commit to briefing Congress on its goals in this regard and when will this occur?
• How do you plan to ensure that the combined Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS) and International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) has adequate resources, staffing? Please outline the Department’s strategy to acquire and maintain requisite arms control and nonproliferation expertise in the Department.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter of vital importance to national and global security.

###